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Abstract  
In Your Western Regions, My East Turkestan (2007), Chinese dissident Wang Lixiong warned of 
the ‘Palestinization’ of the Xinjiang question, defined as reaching ‘a critical point in time’ where 
Uyghurs and Han Chinese enter an interminable ‘ethnic war’. Following the knife attack on Han 
civilians in Kunming (2014), seen by many as an act of Uyghur terror, Wang reminded us that he 
had foreseen this trajectory seven years earlier. This article outlines Wang’s six interpretations of 
‘Palestinization’ in the Xinjiang context, then shows how tightened regulations on religion and 
intrusive religious policing was the main catalyst for local retaliatory violence in 2012-2015. I 
contend that state securitization of religion was counter-productive, heightening societal 
insecurity, and promoting inter-ethnic conflict between Uyghur and Han communities. In Chen 
Quanguo’s era of ‘de-extremification’, the state’s purported attempt to ‘purify’ Islamic practice 
continues to be experienced on the ground as violation of pure, halal space.  
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Introduction 
In Ni de Xiyu, wo de Dongtu (Your Western Regions, My East Turkestan, Locus Publishing, 
2007), Chinese dissident writer Wang Lixiong prophesied the ‘Palestinization’ of the 
Xinjiang question, warning that the region might soon reach ‘a critical point in time’ where 
Uyghurs and Han Chinese enter an ‘interminable ethnic war’ like that seen in Israel-Palestine. 
At the root of this transition, he argued, lay Han in-migration, increased competition for local 
resources and jobs, religious restrictions, and a state securitization strategy that addresses 
symptoms rather than root causes. This book represents a rare example of a Han intellectual 
conducting research from the Uyghurs’ viewpoint. Wang’s year spent in a Xinjiang prison 
with Uyghur detainee Mukhtar ‘opened a window onto the Uyghurs’ inside world’ (Wang 
and Yang 2007).2 Following the knife attack by eight Uyghurs on Han civilians at Kunming 
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train station (2014), which the Chinese state – and eventually outside observers – 
acknowledged as an act of terror, Wang noted that he had foreseen this trajectory seven years 
earlier (Wang 2014). There are various parallels between Israel-Palestine and China-
Xinjiang: occupation of contested territory; state-endorsed demographic transfer; dominant 
group expropriation of resources; inter-ethnic inequalities and discrimination; state practices 
of securitization; and state restrictions on religion. This article does not compare the two 
conflicts;3 rather, it uses Wang’s six interpretations of ‘Palestinization’ in the Xinjiang 
context as a conceptual framework and departure point from which to consider the links 
between securitization and insecurity, and the consequences of intrusive religious policing 
since the 2009 Ürümchi riots. I contend that the state’s securitization of religion was counter-
productive: heightening societal insecurity and promoting inter-ethnic conflict between 
Uyghur and Han communities. I show that what the state views as ‘purification’ of Islamic 
practice (‘de-extremification’) is experienced by local Uyghurs as humiliation and violation: 
violation of the female modesty code (Uy. namähräm) at the micro-level and of pure, halal 
spaces at the macro-level.  
 The term ‘Palestinization’ was originally deployed in the context of the Israel–
Palestine conflict, where it describes resistance against ‘Israelization’ – the refusal by 
Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel to adopt the lifestyle, language, culture and politics of 
dominant Israeli-born secular Jews (Rekhess 2007). The term recently assumed a different 
meaning in another context. Syrian dissident Yassin al-Haj Saleh describes the 
‘Palestinization’ of the Syrian people, arguing that the Assad state has been ‘Israelized’ in the 
sense that, like Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, it can freely colonize and massacre the 
Syrians while enjoying international protection: ‘The local Israel – the Assad state […] 
dehumanizes Syrian protestors and resisters and accuses them of being terrorists, with the 
tacit cooperation of the international community’ (Saleh 2015). But what did Wang Lixiong 
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mean when he spoke of ‘Palestinization’ of Xinjiang? I identify six facets of this concept, 
elaborated in Wang’s book, before focusing on the last: religious restrictions. I highlight 
religious policing because this was the most reliable catalyst for spontaneous local violence 
in 2012-15. I draw on Chinese state discourses of ‘de-extremification’, on representative 
incidents of violence occurring between 2012 and 2015, on interviews conducted with 
Uyghur respondents in Ürümchi in September 2016,4 and on recent scholarly and media 
reportage on surveillance and extra-judicial internment in Xinjiang. I show that earlier 
religious repression led to religious revival, and that subsequent state violence in the form of 
intrusive religious policing procured localised ethnic violence: in sum, securitization of 
religion led to increased insecurity, which was met by the current state programme of pre-
emptive incarceration (extra-judicial internment) of Uyghurs in ‘political re-education 
centres’.  
 
The concept of Palestinization in Your Western Regions, My East Turkestan 
Wang Lixiong (b. 1953) spent the 1990s and 2000s researching the place of ethnic minorities 
in China’s political system, publishing two books on Tibet: Tianzang: Xizang de mingyun 
[Sky Burial: The Fate of Tibet, 1998] and Yu Dalai Lama duihua [Dialogue with the Dalai 
Lama, 2002]. To research Ni de Xiyu, wo de Dongtu [Your Western Regions, My East 
Turkestan, 2007], Wang first travelled to Xinjiang in 1999. Incarcerated in a high-security 
prison in Miquan, he shared a cell with Uyghur prisoner, Mukhtar. Wang’s discussions with 
Mukhtar form the substance of the book, which contains four sections: Introduction; 
Travelogue (four trips to Xinjiang, 2003–2006); Dialogue with Mukhtar; and Letters to 
Mukhtar. Drawing on local conversations, he discusses deepening urban segregation, 
growing Han nepotism and corruption, the colonial economy and Han control of resources, 
the education system, and the politics of cultural uniformization (sinicization). While Wang 
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does not advocate independence for Xinjiang, he does suggest alternatives, including 
guaranteeing genuine religious freedom and controlling Han labour migration to Xinjiang and 
Tibet, treated as ‘cultural protection zones’ (Veg 2008). Below, I consider the six facets of 
‘Palestinization’, as Wang applies them to Xinjiang . 
1. Full mobilisation of ethno-nationalism and ethnic hatred; Intractable inter-ethnic 
conflict 
The most explicit application of the ‘Palestinization’ concept found in Wang’s book concerns 
the comprehensive embrace of ethno-national sentiment and ethnic hatred in the Uyghur 
community, including by children: 
Something a foreign reporter once wrote […] I find hard to forget: a 7-year-old Uyghur child, 
when obliged to raise the China flag every evening, would always stamp on it first. […] Truly, the 
level of ethnic hatred is most visible on the face of a child. And if even children feel that hatred, 
then you know that this hatred is shared by the entire ethnic group. This is reflected in the fact that 
you always see children at scenes of violence in Palestine. (Wang 2007: 41)5  
 
The conflict carries a further sense of ‘Palestinization’ when it reaches a tipping point: 
 
Once you have exceeded [the critical point], you will find yourself in an ethnic war such as that 
between Palestine and Israel, where there is no way out and you have no sense when it will end. 
(Wang 2007: 47)
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I suggest there have been two tipping points since Wang made this prophecy. The first came 
during the 2009 Ürümchi riots, which witnessed a complete breakdown of trust, with Uyghur 
households refusing safe haven to Han neighbours, Han doctors refusing to treat Uyghur 
patients, etc. (Smith Finley 2011: 83–84; 89). Stories of Uyghurs being shot and their bodies 
burned by Chinese authorities became ‘powerful discursive artefacts’ that continued to 
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influence relationships between Uyghurs, Han and the state (Millward 2009: 354). The 
second came in 2012, when spontaneous local violence erupted in response to intrusive 
religious policing and state penetration of private (halal) Uyghur spaces.  
 My 2016 interviews confirmed that the impact of the 5 July 2009 riots (known in 
Chinese as ‘7.5’) had been deep. In Uyghur eyes, the state and its representatives treated the 
‘7.5’ violence as a one-sided affair instigated by Uyghur perpetrators, ignored the injustice of 
the Shaoguan factory murders that precipitated it, and sided with its majority Han citizens 
(Smith Finley 2011).7 Local perceptions of bias were further encouraged when 24 of 26 death 
sentences handed out following the violence went to Uyghurs, while only two went to Han 
(Uyghur Human Rights Project, cited in Roberts 2012: 15). Consequently, both well- and less 
well-integrated Uyghur citizens lost confidence in the Chinese government, which appeared 
to them to represent only the dominant Han Chinese. In a conversation about the selective 
securitization of the BRT express bus routes (which mainly serve Han areas of Ürümchi), a 
former state employee R2 reflected: ‘[W]e all know that the government is working only for 
them [Hans] – that was made very clear during and after 7.5’. Several respondents confirmed 
reports of a rush among Uyghurs to move out of Han districts, and vice versa, after the riots. 
R2 observed that the local government had to take measures to prevent self-segregation, 
describing how authorities refused transfer of Uyghur children from schools in the (Han-
dominated) north to schools in the (Uyghur-dominated) south-east, forcing families to 
postpone relocation.8 Z, who successfully moved south-east after 2009, had previously 
figured among my most integrated respondents, residing in a Han neighbourhood and 
enjoying reasonable relationships with Han co-workers (while conscious of employment 
inequalities). However, in 2016, when hailing a taxi, Z always sought a Uyghur driver. 
Another indicator of broken relations is the relative failure of government material incentives 
to encourage Uyghur–Han marriages since 2014. When this policy was introduced in 
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Cherchen county, officials counted just 57 mixed-race couples among a population of around 
60,000 (Kaiman 2014). According to R2, only impoverished rural Uyghurs, with few 
prospects and resources, responded to the programme. She described them as ‘opportunists’ 
with whom other Uyghurs refuse to socialize (Uy. arlashmaydu).  
 In addition to ethnic segregation and inter-ethnic violence between adults during 
and since 2009, violence has occurred among children of the two groups, lending credence to 
Wang’s diagnosis. Already in the mid-1990s, sentiments among Uyghur adults of cultural 
antipathy, moral disapprobation and anger towards the Xinjiang Han, expressed as negative 
stereotypes, had reproduced in the youth a swell of negative feeling towards Han people. This 
is exemplified in an incident from that time where a small Uyghur child appearing on live 
television refused to speak to a Han person introduced as ‘Uncle’, rejecting him using the 
derogatory term Khitay (Smith Finley 2013: 11). After the 2009 riots, there was a marked 
increase in clashes between children. In 2011, a teenaged Uyghur asylum seeker in the UK 
attested that he had experienced ethnicized pupil-on-pupil violence at his school in Qaramay. 
In 2012, violent clashes between Uyghur and Han male pupils were reported at a high school 
in Ghulja, during which a Han student drowned. Four Uyghur boys aged around 15 received 
administrative sentences, but no Han boy was punished (Qiao, Hai and Musha 2013).  
 There have also been disturbing reports of inter-ethnic violence visited upon 
children by adults, suggesting that children from the other ethnic group have come to be 
equally perceived as the ‘enemy’. In 2012, police raids on ‘unsanctioned’ religious schools in 
Khotän involving the use of tear gas resulted in the death of an 11-year-old Uyghur boy and 
the hospitalization of 12 other children (Musha and Gao 2012); in 2013, a seven-year-old 
Uyghur boy was hacked to death by a Han male in Pichan county, Turpan prefecture. 
Enkerjan Ariz had been playing with two other Uyghur children near a brick kiln run by Han 
residents. One Han worker thought the children had come to steal, caught Enkerjan and took 
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him into his home, where he killed him. One hundred and fifty relatives of the boy later tried 
to attack Han homes around the kiln in revenge (Hoshur and Vandebrink 2013). 
 The region has also seen peaceful protests by Uyghur school pupils in recent years, 
suggesting cross-generational communal dissatisfaction with state policies. In 2013, nearly 
100 pupils from the Qizilsu No.1 High School marched onto the streets in Atush when the 
school banned headscarves, while those at another high school near Khotän walked out of 
class in protest at the lack of Uyghur-language signage (Qiao and Keyum 2013). Taken 
together, these examples suggest that children are increasingly drawn into the conflict.  
 
2. Resource competition  
A second facet of Palestinization discernible in Wang’s book is increased competition over 
land, water, food and jobs in Xinjiang, resulting from Han in-migration: 
As the number of Han people grows, Han Chinese come directly face to face with local groups in 
myriad ways in everyday life. They compete for local resources, and snatch portions of the 
market. Inter-ethnic conflict is thus no longer metaphysical but is intimately connected to each 
person’s material interests and everyday experiences (Wang 2007: 47). 
 
Uyghur resentment over Han in-migration, unequal employment opportunities, and state/Han 
expropriation of oil and natural gas is of long standing.9 What changed after 2010 (the year of 
the first Xinjiang Work Forum and the launch of the National Partner Assistance Programme, 
an initiative ostensibly intended to redistribute wealth from East to West) is that the state 
began to aggressively encourage Han migration to south Xinjiang. Until then, Han settlers 
were relatively few in the south; now, Uyghurs faced competition for land and resources in 
their demographic heartland. One of the first things R said to me in 2016 was: ‘The insects 
(chongzi) are here in much greater numbers now.’ This indicated the persistence and 
8 
 
aggravation of the acrimony that had characterized the mid-1990s, when Han in-migrants 
were routinely labelled ‘ants’, ‘locusts’ and ‘bedbugs’ (Smith Finley 2013: 118–129). One 
incident of premeditated violence in southern Aqsu prefecture demonstrates local feeling 
toward the accelerated appropriation of local resources by Han in-migrants. In September 
2015, a group of Uyghur men attacked the Sogan Colliery in Bay county, targeting security 
guards, the mine owner’s residence and a dormitory housing 300–400 mostly Han workers. 
At least 50 were killed and 50 injured, and most casualties were Han workers (Hoshur and 
Lipes 2015b). The suspects, who came from neighboring farms, took control of the dynamite 
at the colliery, called the local police station to report the incident, then used coal-filled 
trucks to ram police vans, before attacking injured officers with knives (Hoshur and Lipes 
2015a). Elsewhere, a local resident of Pichan, Turpan prefecture, observed that the killing of 
a local Uyghur boy (see above) had ‘stirred up Uyghur residents’ anger over Han Chinese 
migration to the area and pollution and destruction of land from the brick kilns run by Han 
Chinese’ (Hoshur and Vandenbrink 2013). Such incidents demonstrate how increased Han 
settler activity in the south has sparked conflicts, particularly where that activity has affected 
control over local resources. 
  
3. Disproportionate/indiscriminate state response; pre-emptive strike  
A third parallel Wang drew with Israel-Palestine concerns the Chinese state’s use of 
disproportionate, indiscriminate and pre-emptive force: 
Currently, the authorities in Xinjiang follow the policy of ‘Attack first; strike those who stick their 
heads out of the nest […]’ The enhanced phase of this is: ‘Strike even when they don’t stick their 
heads out; chase them and strike’. (Wang 2007: 48)  
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Before 2001, the Chinese state had twice reacted with disproportionate force to local unrest it 
perceived as threatening. Vicziany points to around 1600 Uyghurs killed by anti-riot troops, 
tanks and fighter planes during the 1990 Baren insurrection, and approximately 400 Uyghur 
deaths during the suppression of the 1997 Ghulja disturbances, which had begun as a 
peaceful protest about the arrest of religious students (2003: 249–251). Following the Ghulja 
event, Chinese police pre-emptively rounded up Uyghur youths in the city every year on its 
anniversary to prevent recurrence (Vicziany 2003: 252). After 2001, when China opted to 
join the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT), the state increasingly adopted preventative 
and pre-emptive methods, while continuing to use disproportionate force against those it now 
called ‘terrorists’ (formerly, ‘splittists’) (Clarke 2010: 547–550). Following 9/11, as many as 
3000 Uyghurs were detained on separatism charges, although no violent incidents had 
occurred before or after (Vicziany 2003: 255);10 pre-emptive policing thus treated all 
separatists as potential terrorists. This trend towards over-reaction has continued, so that the 
Chinese state:  
tends to overreact and to see terrorism even where it does not exist […] if the police or other state 
organs see manifestations of Uighur culture and Islam that look as if they could be potentially 
terrorist, they are apt [to] tread on them unnecessarily. (Mackerras 2014: 248) 
Chinese state behaviour since 2001 suggests an insecure response to expressions of Uyghur 
culture (especially religious culture), representing, perceiving and securitizing them as an 
existential threat to China’s national unification and the majority Han society.11 Here we find 
a direct parallel with Israel-Palestine: the Israeli state’s deployment of the police Anti-Terror 
unit and live ammunition to suppress solidarity protests by Israeli Palestinians during the 
second intifada reflects state perceptions of that group as an existential threat to national 
security and the majority Jewish society (Olesker 2014: 372; 376).  
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 Pre-emptive policing since 2001 has become increasingly indiscriminate. All 
Uyghur and Tibetan residents of Beijing and Shanghai were rounded up and relocated prior to 
the 2008 Olympics. This act of ethnic profiling implied that no Uyghur/Tibetan could be 
trusted (Millward 2009: 349; Roberts 2018: 10), vilifying and excluding the entire Uyghur 
population, regardless of individuals’ political views or level of linguistic/social integration. 
The 2009 Ürümchi riots, which began as a peaceful protest about the murders of two Uyghur 
factory workers, were experienced by the Chinese state as affecting its ‘core national security 
interests’; it reacted by introducing reforms allowing unrestricted local use of force without 
central permission (Odgaard and Nielsen 2014: 542–543; 545). Simultaneously, the 
government began to adopt securitization and surveillance measures that resulted in 
systematic discrimination against, and exclusion of, all Uyghurs.  
 The state’s failure to distinguish between individuals in its securitization of the 
Uyghur population was underlined in my 2016 interviews: even khizmätchilär (relatively 
integrated Uyghurs, employed in state work units) complained of being tarred with the same 
brush as alleged ‘extremists’. Respondents appeared wracked with anxiety concerning the 
state’s surveillance tools (‘There are eyes and ears everywhere’). Even those who now 
worked in security – an increasingly likely profession for previously unemployed Uyghurs – 
were fatigued by the securitization regime. Z, a security guard, would say: ‘Please forgive 
me’ (Uy. Khapa bolmang) to Uyghur residents as he conducted bag or body checks. R, a 
policeman, joked grimly that there was only one kind of police in Xinjiang – political police 
(Uy. siyasiy saqchi). He observed that his job was ‘exhausting since the 7.5 incident, with 
everything checked (Uy. täkshürüsh), everywhere, all the time’. Indeed, the police role is 
itself securitized: R was not permitted to travel abroad because of government fears that he 
might pass sensitive information to foreigners.  
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4. ‘Pressure cooker’ effect 
The fourth facet of Palestinization explored by Wang is the removal of channels of dialogue 
between Uyghurs and the state, creating a ‘pressure cooker’ effect: 
when people make pleas, protest and even cause trouble, this shows that those people still hold out 
hope for a solution. When they stop speaking or acting […] this is not stability; it only 
demonstrates that they have lost that hope […] By ‘nipping all contradictions in the bud’, you 
won’t actually remove the contradictions. Rather, you are putting pressure on them, and 
deepening them. These contradictions accumulate, and, triggered by some unforeseen event, 
emerge from the silence as a clap of thunder. (Wang 2007: 48) 
 
Hassid, discussing the role of political blogs in China, writes that they can either act as 
‘safety valve’, reducing and channelling social tensions (when free comment is allowed on 
issues introduced by the state-controlled media), or ‘pressure cooker’ (when censorship 
causes frustration and increased social tensions) (2012: 225–226). Wang’s description 
resembles this analogy, suggesting that the state’s unwillingness to allow Uyghurs a voice 
will lead eventually to an explosion.  
 The placing of the lid on the pressure cooker can be traced to the aftermath of the 
1990 Baren insurrection in southern Xinjiang, when stifling controls on Islam were re-
introduced after a decade of comparative religious freedom in the eighties (Castets 2015b: 
109). When ethno-political aspirations grew in Xinjiang across the first half of the nineties in 
response to the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chinese state became more determined 
to silence Uyghur voices. Thus, when Uyghurs marched in Ghulja to protest local arrests of 
religious students in 1997, and rioted in Ürümchi after the Shaoguan factory murders in 2009, 
the state read both events as ‘separatist’, and the latter as ‘terrorist’, though local aspirations 
to independence had subsided (most Uyghurs recognised there was no possibility). Dialogue 
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channels were progressively foreclosed during this period, leaving Uyghurs little to no 
political space in which to engage with the state (Clarke 2015). After the 2009 riots, Uyghur 
economist Ilham Tokhti accused the CCP of applying policies that fanned discord, describing 
the situation in the following terms: ‘Every time something happens, the government 
responds with one word: pressure. High pressure, high pressure, and even greater pressure. 
This leads to greater resistance and more conflict’ (in Meyer 2016b). Tokhti had been 
perhaps the sole remaining communication channel between the Chinese government and the 
Uyghur community, and certainly the most likely source of conflict resolution. The state 
responded by sentencing him to life imprisonment for ‘separatism’ (Meyer 2016b).  
 From 2012, state pressure manifested in increasingly restrictive religious 
regulations and highly intrusive religious policing, leading to frequent, spontaneous incidents 
of local violence, themselves a reaction to state violence and perceived violation of halal 
spaces. The Chinese government responded by investing in a multi-tiered security state in 
Xinjiang, enabling Orwellian levels of surveillance. Its securitizing activities have 
exacerbated Uyghurs’ sense of physical insecurity, placing them increasingly under siege 
(Zenz and Leibold 2017). Thus, while the pattern is of local violence increasing in relation to 
rising levels of repression and securitization, each time a blow-up occurs the state response is 
to further increase the pressure.  
 The build-up of pressure was evident from my interactions with Uyghur 
respondents in 2016. As R2 observed: ‘No-one trusts anyone. Everyone is scared and looking 
out for their families. No-one wants any trouble. It is always better to have one less issue than 
one more (Ch. Duo yishi bu ru shao yishi) [where each new ‘issue’ may become a political 
problem].’ At our first meeting in public, R2 and S were visibly nervous, approaching me 
cautiously one by one, then keeping a watchful eye on the vicinity. Periodically, they 
abandoned a hushed conversation about politics, and launched into an unrelated, innocent 
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topic. R2 expressed relief at having retired from her state work unit: ‘I never have to worry 
about politics again.’ Most striking were my interactions with A. We met first in a restaurant, 
then moved to her home. Throughout our conversation, she baffled me by repeatedly 
declaring, straight-faced, how ‘safe’ she felt at security checkpoints. Knowing her previous 
political position, I wondered whether her statements were genuine. On another day, H drove 
A and me out of Ürümchi. A walked me up a deserted mountain track and then spoke 
directly: 
I have much in my heart I want to say, but I can’t say any of it. Well, I can say it, but no-one must 
hear it. If the [government’s] policies are fine, then why am I afraid of speaking? The policies are 
formed with no prior consultation, implemented without warning, and without helping people 
understand how those policies can be used to their advantage. 
Evidently, A’s words during our first meeting had been uttered in anxiety. H admitted he was 
afraid of speaking in his own home (in case of audio surveillance), while A confided that she 
feared the police could listen to private conversations through people’s mobile phones.12 
They coped with paranoia through humour. In the mountains, A, H and I joked about how 
‘unsafe’ we felt in the absence of security forces, with A pointing to two golden inflatable 
lions before a real estate office: ‘We have these to protect us here, and I like these better!’ 
Later, A told of local authorities’ plans to install CCTV cameras above the entrance of every 
home, then defused the tension by reporting her friend’s comic response: ‘Well, they’d better 
not put one in the bedroom!’ Alternatively, tensions erupted in anger, as when I told Q of 
how U had counselled me to visit the south alone, warning: ‘Look at everything, say nothing, 
speak to no-one.’ At this, Q (a retired state employee) became rebellious, exclaiming: ‘Why 
on earth shouldn’t we show the south to our English friend? What’s wrong with that? We 
won’t hurt anyone! And if anyone says we can’t, then damn his mother! [Ch. Qu ta ma de].’ 
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 Some Xinjiang Han are also troubled by ever-increasing state pressure, questioning 
its purported aim of social stability. Following a knife attack in Qarghiliq in 2012, a Han 
doctor at Bo-Ai Hospital observed: 
I think the sense of dissatisfaction and resistance is a direct result of the government enforcing a 
high-pressure policy on Uyghur people […] I have a very good relationship with my Uyghur 
colleagues at the hospital […] I don’t want to see this kind [of] thing happen, but I also don’t want 
to see excessive controls on the local Uyghur people […] If the [harsh] policy continues, there 
will be more of this kind of thing in the future (Hoshur and Abdilim 2012). 
 
5. Radicalisation  
The fifth parallel Wang draws with Palestine is the potential for state religious repression to 
lead to Uyghur radicalization:  
If it is not permitted to open religious schools in Xinjiang, then those students will just go to 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, or the Central Asian nations […] Not only will they study the Quran, but 
they’ll also be taught the concept of holy war and be trained in terrorism. Then they’ll return to 
Xinjiang and initiate terrorist activities in a bid to secure the freedom to propagate religion (Wang 
2007: 48). 
 
As Davis (2004) notes in her study of suicide martyrs, placing extreme pressure on a group’s 
existence and identity can produce a moral narrative of oppression, justice and liberation. 
Some scholars believe that fusion of national aspirations with religious quests for purity and 
redemption is recently discernible in Xinjiang. For Clarke (2015), attacks in 2013–2014 
suggest that some Uyghur militants began to adopt the tactics of regional and global Islamist 
organisations; he cites the 2013 Tian’anmen crash incident, the 2014 Kunming rail station 
attack, and the 2014 Ürümchi suicide bombing as examples of indiscriminate violence 
against civilians. Kanat (2016) writes that disproportionate state force has caused some 
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Uyghurs to themselves consider resolving the conflict through force, triggering new acts of 
local violence. Castets (2015b) suggests that while a few incidents occurring in 2011–2014 
may have been guided/inspired by the Turkestan Islamic Party based in Pakistan, most were 
perpetrated by local youths radicalized by resentment towards the Chinese state.13 
 Others contend that Uyghur militants remain mostly located outside Xinjiang, and 
question how far they have embraced global jihadist ideologies. Roberts sees no conclusive 
evidence that militant organisations named by the Chinese government (the East Turkestan 
Islamic Movement ETIM, the Turkestan Islamic Party TIP) have ever established 
sophisticated operations in Xinjiang, showing how ‘sloppy research and unreliable sources’ 
underpin an ‘unsubstantiated narrative about Uyghur terrorism’ (Roberts 2012: 2–6). His 
interviews with former Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo Bay and analysis of the 
Guantanamo hearings reveal that Uyghur ‘training camps’ in Afghanistan, intended to 
prepare Uyghurs to fight the Chinese state, were far from professional, organized and well-
resourced venues. Interviewees described a one-off opportunity to handle a single 
Kalashnikov rifle, and described their sojourn in the camp as a stop-over on the way to refuge 
in Turkey (Roberts 2012: 6–7). In a 2004 interview, the deputy chairman of ETIM, Abudula 
Kariaji, noted that while the organisation had permission from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to 
establish camps in Afghanistan, it received no financing from either and suffered tense 
relations with both due to Uyghurs’ focus on China and disinterest in global jihad (Roberts 
2012: 10). Castets writes that many young Uyghurs aligned to the Turkestan Islamic Party in 
Central Asia or Pakistan are seeking sanctuary from potential extradition to China, and do not 
subscribe to ideologies of global jihad (2015b: 108). Both Roberts (2012) and Castets 
(2015b) suggest that while the Turkestan Islamic Party has released online videos claiming 
responsibility for attacks in Xinjiang, these often contradict local facts: they show only that 
TIP is capable of posting videos to create fear among Chinese citizens, not that they are 
16 
 
capable of organising acts of violence inside China. Roberts recently put the number of 
Uyghurs currently in Syria in the low thousands (includes militants’ families). He notes that 
while most left Xinjiang after the post-2009 crackdown with no intention of joining a militant 
group, they also left ‘with a sense that their identity and religion was under siege,’ thus are 
vulnerable to recruitment by militant groups claiming to fight the enemies of Islam (2018: 
21–22).  
 Certainly, some of the incidents occurring in Xinjiang in 2012–2015 fall under the 
category of terrorism, defined as ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against non-combatant targets […], usually intended to influence an audience’ (United States 
Code, in Roberts 2012: 12). A representative example is the Maralbeshi incident in 2014. 
Four Uyghur men armed with knives and explosives attacked a farmers’ market, leaving 22 
dead. They arrived on motorcycles at 10:30 a.m., following which two attacked police patrol 
officers and two attacked Han Chinese stall owners. The attack was carefully planned to 
ensure that no Uyghur customers were in the market. A retired government employee 
observed that the assailants may have been frustrated by the jailing of over 1000 Uyghur 
youths in the county since May 2014, under the state’s anti-terror campaign (Hoshur 2014). 
Local descriptions illustrate that the attack was premeditated and intended to cause harm to 
Han Chinese non-combatants. It was clearly intended to create fear in the Han community 
and to influence government policy regarding Han in-migration and securitization practices 
that exclusively target Uyghurs. What is not clear is how far the attackers were influenced by 
global jihadist ideology, if at all. 
 In my 2016 interviews, respondents acknowledged that ‘wrong-headed forms of 
Islam’ had entered the region from Saudi Arabia. A and H, modern professionals originally 
from south Xinjiang, worried that some southerners had lately adopted ‘extreme behaviours’, 
e.g. refusing to walk on asphalt roads built by ‘unclean’ Han labourers. Yet they stressed that 
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such behaviour did not necessarily make those people terrorists. It is important to note that 
piousness does not automatically lead to hatred and violence. U, a keenly observant Muslim 
originally from Kashgar, remarked that, in the end, human beings are all just one people (Uy. 
bir millät). This move in the direction of mutual human tolerance constituted his personal 
reaction, as a genuinely pious Muslim, to the horror of the 2009 Ürümchi riots. R2 and S, 
who might be described as secular nationalists, said they supported state efforts to stamp out 
extremism. Nonetheless, R2 added – sympathetically – that ‘some Uyghur sheep have been 
forced by circumstance to turn into tigers’, suggesting that violence is a new response to 
intolerable pressure. R, a policeman, confirmed that ‘a small number of Uyghurs’ are training 
alongside jihadis in Syria. However, he emphasized that this reflects not an ideological 
commitment to global jihad but a practical means to a local, political end – they would return 
to free Xinjiang from repression. This matches Wang’s description above, and the experience 
of a Uyghur refugee in Turkey who had previously fought in Syria, interviewed by Roberts 
(2018: 22).  
 
6. State restrictions on religion 
The sixth facet of Palestinization outlined in Wang’s book concerns state restrictions on the 
right to conduct everyday Islamic practices within a pure, halal space (the Uyghur body; the 
Uyghur home; the Uyghur-run business):  
 
Muhtar: There is a real possibility that people could choose this road [extremist violence]. Mainly 
very religious people, because their goal is to protect their own space. There are now too many 
state restrictions on religion. If you grow a beard, they will force you to shave it off and fine you 
20 yuan. When a mature, earnest Muslim is humiliated in this way, what can he do? How can he 
express his resistance? It’s even worth dying to do so. (Interview transcript in Wang 2007: 224) 
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I contend that tightened religious restrictions and intrusive religious policing provoked most 
of the violent incidents occurring in 2012-2015. The causal relationship between China’s 
accelerated anti-terror policies since 2009 and increased terrorist activities was earlier 
highlighted by Roberts: ‘The targets chosen suggest that local security organs in the XUAR 
are helping to cultivate a self-fulfilling prophecy, creating “terrorists” through their vigorous 
attempts to prevent “terrorism”’ (2012: 13). This dynamic is also observable in local 
reactions to state religious policies, such that repression leads to revival leads to increased 
repression leads to resistance: ‘The Chinese state […] has stimulated an Islamic renewal 
where there wouldn’t necessarily have been one’ (Smith Finley, cited in Denyer 2014).14 
While the context of religious repression in Xinjiang is not new, the repression has 
steadily intensified over nearly three decades. After the 1990 Baren insurrection, heavy 
restrictions were imposed on religion, including closing mosques and requiring imams to 
pledge loyalty to the Chinese government (Steele and Kuo 2007: 6). These restrictions were 
accelerated across the 1990s, particularly following separatists’ assassination of a Uyghur 
official in Kucha in 1996.15 In response, the CCP issued Document No.7, urgently 
recommending that Han Chinese be moved in to stabilize unrest, and that Uyghurs lose the 
right to study religion abroad.16 This crackdown is widely believed to have catalysed the 
1997 Ghulja demonstrations. Suggested triggers include arrests of taliplar (religious students) 
who opposed state appointments of ‘politically loyal’ mullahs, disruptions of mosque 
gatherings during Ramadan, and arrests of Uyghur women praying in a private house 
(Vicziany 2003: 250–251); the forcible dispersal by Chinese police of women praying at a 
mosque (Steele and Kuo 2007: 8); and a ban on mäshräp (then an all-male moral/religious 
gathering) (Gladney 2002: 267).  
By the late 1990s/early 2000s, state repression was impacting negatively on Uyghur 
attitudes:  
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Anti-Han sentiment is far stronger in Kashgar than elsewhere, mainly in response to the 
government’s own efforts to curtail Islamic practices there. Instead of seeing Islam as a channel 
through which local Uyghurs are able to express social and political frustrations […] the 
government chooses to perceive it as the cause of those frustrations, which in turn gives rise to 
actions that further exacerbate the situation. (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004: 316) 
 
Local frustrations were compounded from 2004, when the state launched a new assault on the 
Uyghur language, moving to phase out Uyghur-medium education (Schluessel 2007). The 
government hoped to reduce inter-ethnic tension by isolating Uyghurs from their cultural 
heritage, thus weakening their national identity (Meyer 2016a). To bypass constitutional 
protections for minority religions and languages and justify its securitization of religious 
practice, Beijing turned Uyghur Islam and the Uyghur language into national security threats. 
By 2010, ‘almost any attempt by Uyghurs to preserve their ethnic identity and religious 
practices was seen by Beijing as “unpatriotic” and a threat to the motherland’s territorial 
integrity’ (Meyer 2016a: 4–5; see also Clarke 2010: 545, 551, and Human Rights Watch 
2018).  
After 2009, state securitization of religion moved to a new level, as ‘attacks directed 
against the politicization of Islam […] gave way to the critique of Islam itself’ (Castets 
2015a: 230; see also Clarke 2010: 551–552). Everyday practices followed by peaceful, 
moderate Muslims elsewhere were outlawed in Xinjiang, including wearing full veils or 
robes (hijab; niqab; burqa; jilbab); the growing of beards by all but elderly men; holding 
wedding ceremonies without singing and dancing, or funerals without feasts (music and 
banqueting are proscribed by conservative clerics) (Denyer 2014); giving children Islamic 
names (Human Rights Watch 2018); unauthorized study of religion abroad (Castets 2015a); 
praying in non-designated places; reading the Qur’an; learning or teaching about Islam in 
public or at home; performing the Hajj; and refusing to drink alcohol (Meyer 2016a).  
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This crackdown included from 2012 a highly intrusive strategy of religious policing 
known as ‘One village, one police station; one household, one police officer’. Under this, a 
single police officer leads up to three assistant police staff in each village, forming a garrison 
of informal, low-skilled security staff in contract-based positions who do not – in theory – 
possess enforcement rights (Zenz and Leibold 2017). Assistant police have routinely been 
used in sweep-and-search operations in rural homes, experienced locally as highly invasive. 
Ilham Tokhti had this to say on the strategy, prior to his incarceration:  
  
Personnel making visits to the villages and households include cadres, unemployed people whom 
the government hires, even some young ruffians, people on government subsidies, police officers, 
special weapons and tactics (SWAT) officers, and so on. I absolutely could not put up with people 
like this randomly breaking into my house. (Tokhti 2014) 
 
 Plentiful evidence supports a hypothesis that increased religious repression is linked 
with increased levels of violence in Xinjiang. In my 2016 interviews, long-term Uyghur 
respondents from all backgrounds deplored the indiscriminate restrictions imposed on 
everyday religious practices and the state’s blanket association of moderate Islam with terror. 
Some declared that people ‘should have the freedom to dress how they like’; others 
condemned the assumption that all Uyghurs are Islamist terrorists, observing that those 
southerners who did resort to violence were motivated by politics, not religion. Still others 
suggested that recent violence had resulted directly from repressive religious policies. First-
time respondents in 2016 spoke of fleeing to Ürümchi from Kashgar, Aqsu and Khotän 
because ‘there is no religious freedom down south’. They ridiculed prohibitions on male 
facial hair, the niqab and the burqa, and asserted that the restrictions had ‘caused violence and 
chaos in the south’. They described how under-age Uyghur boys in Ürümchi would borrow 
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and pass around older peers’ identity cards to circumvent the state-imposed age requirement 
at the mosque (18) and allow each in turn to enter and pray.17 
One striking local statement against state controls on religion took a musical form. 
Walking into a music dukan in Döngköwrük in September 2016, I watched the video then 
playing on the TV screen. In it, a Uyghur man wearing a doppa walks along the street, 
periodically bumping into other Uyghurs. Each time, they stop to advise him on how to 
(re-)angle his headgear. As this pattern repeated multiple times, my suspicion grew that this 
was a satire of state restrictions on religious dress. Initially circumspect, the young woman 
working there shortly confirmed this with a smile and fetched the DVD box. The song, by 
Muhämmätjan Abduqadir, was the album’s title track ‘Others Will Say How’ (Khäq nimä 
däp qalal, 2016). She told me: ‘Everyone is listening to this CD now.’ 
A catalogue of events in 2012-2015 equally illustrate how the government’s 
repression of everyday religious practices led to state violence against Uyghur individuals 
and households, producing in turn a violent, retaliatory response from Uyghur communities. 
In 2013, at least 46 people were killed during an attack on police and government 
establishments in Lukqun, Turpan prefecture, in an event triggered directly by religious 
repression. A week earlier, 19 local Uyghurs had received prison sentences for alleged crimes 
of ‘religious extremism’ (Hoshur 2013a). Furthermore, the incident occurred around the start 
of Ramadan, when Xinjiang authorities have in recent years attempted to prevent Uyghurs 
from fasting (Agence France Presse 2013). Following the incident, Abdurehim Damolla, 
imam at the Kazihan Mosque and Deputy Chairman of Turpan city’s Islamic Association, 
further angered the local community by referring to the Lukqun attackers as ‘terrorists’ 
(rather than acknowledging their frustrations at unfounded allegations of ‘religious 
extremism’), and was stabbed to death. Two weeks earlier, he had publicly advocated the 
government policy discouraging ‘religious beards’ and headscarves as he conducted a funeral 
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ceremony. According to one local official, ‘the youths’ anger was only stopped [from boiling 
over] that day because of the police’s warnings and intervention’ (Hoshur 2013b).  
 While these incidents involved intentional – albeit retaliatory – attacks on state organs 
and personnel, many others have occurred impromptu. Often, they were local protests at 
police detentions perceived as unjust, as in 2013 when a crowd tried to de-arrest Uyghurs 
outside a mosque in Ayköl, Aqsu prefecture, on the eve of Eid al-Fitr (the end of Ramadan). 
Security forces responded by opening fire on the crowd (Hoshur 2013b). Other incidents 
were impassioned reactions to state intrusions into Uyghurs’ private homes, which had led 
inevitably to violation of the Islamic female modesty code (Uy. namähräm).18 Violence was 
triggered in Seriqbuya in 2013 when Chinese ‘community workers’ and police broke in to 
Uyghur houses, forcing women to unveil and demanding that men shave their beards. One 
man protested and was shot dead. This precipitated retaliatory violence against police 
officials, resulting in several deaths and the torching of the house. While the state’s report 
described a less-than-credible scenario in which community workers had stumbled across 
terrorists making explosives and ‘lethal weapons’, earlier Chinese media accounts (now 
deleted) stated that the occupants had simply been taking lessons in the reading of the Qur’an 
(Grammaticas 2013; Hoshur, Qiao and Hai, 2013). In another event, hundreds of Uyghur 
villagers marched down the Hanerik-Khotän highway on 28 June 2013, angered by the 
detention of Mettursun Metseydi, a popular young imam from an unauthorized mosque on the 
rural edge of Hanerik. Metseydi had drawn crowds by condemning state religious restrictions 
as ‘a humiliation’ (compare Muhtar’s description above), especially those that fined taxi 
drivers who carried veiled women, prohibited doctors from treating veiled women, or 
required women to unveil during police checks (note that each scenario violates the female 
modesty code in a public place). After forcing entry to the mosque (now sealed by the 
authorities) to pray, congregants then proceeded down the highway to Khotän. Shouting 
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Allahu akbar (God is great) and clutching simple farm implements and lengths of wood, they 
were confronted by paramilitary police on a pedestrian bridge, who then became nervous and 
opened fire. The South China Morning Post placed the death toll at 60. Meanwhile, county 
hospital staff were warned by state officials not to treat patients with gunshot wounds. The 
impact on public opinion of this event cannot be underestimated. One Uyghur professor told 
reporters: ‘People here are just boiling over with anger’, while a young taxi driver declared: 
‘The Chinese killed our brothers in the street like they were dogs’, adding ‘we will have our 
revenge’ (Jacobs 2013). It is not difficult to see how what Chinese officials later categorized 
as a ‘crackdown on terrorist and extremist organizations’ could lead to retaliatory local 
violence in a vicious cycle.  
In 2014, 200,000 Communist Party cadres were dispatched to rural Xinjiang to ‘listen 
to Uyghurs’ concerns’, a development experienced locally as an intrusive attempt to surveil 
Uyghurs’ private lives. The state spent US$2 million establishing a network of informers and 
surveillance cameras in Yäkän to enable house-to-house inspections that would identify 
‘separatists, terrorists and religious extremists’ –now including women who wore veils or 
burqas and young men with long beards (Denyer 2014). During 2014, house-to-house 
searches for books or clothing that betrayed ‘conservative’ religious beliefs, carried out 
during Ramadan, led to deadly protests. Women wearing veils were detained and young men 
arrested on flimsy pretexts, while students and civil servants were forced to break their fast. 
On 18 July, hundreds of Uyghurs gathered outside a government building in Alaqagha, 
Kucha county, angered by the arrest of two dozen girls and women who had refused to 
remove their headscarves. When protesters threw stones, bottles and bricks, police opened 
fire, killing at least two (Denyer 2014). Then, on 28 July, police shot dead 59 Uyghurs in 
Elishku, Yäkän county, after more than 300 attacked a police station with knives, axes and 
sticks. Protestors were enraged by restrictions during Ramadan and the extra-judicial killing 
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of a Uyghur family of five in Beshkent village (Denyer 2014; Hoshur 2014). A scuffle had 
broken out following forced police entry into the family’s home and an attempt to remove the 
women’s veils. Victims included a seven-year-old boy and his 72-year-old grandfather. 
Consequently, riots took place in three other villages in Elishku, where government offices, 
Uyghur officials and Han civilians were targeted (Hoshur, Sulaiman and Yang 2014). 
 
From securitization to insecurity: ethnicized policies, violation of halal spaces and cycles 
of violence  
Before 2009, Uyghur violence had been directed at the state and its representatives (Thum 
2009; Smith Finley 2011), including ‘collaborating’ Uyghur officials (Smith 2007). By 2009, 
the situation had changed; the Ürümchi riots involved harrowing scenes of angry young 
Uyghur men attacking Han civilians, including men, children and even pregnant women 
(Palmer 2013). Such violence flagged a re-orientation along ethnic lines, in response to 
ethnically differentiated policies (Thum 2009). Particularly since 2001, a stream of state 
policies had discriminated directly against Uyghurs. These included the requirement from 
2004 that Uyghurs study in Chinese, while Han need not learn minority languages 
(Schluessel 2007), and the confiscation of Uyghur passports in 2007 (Clarke 2010), not to 
mention employment discrimination against Uyghurs. Meanwhile, Uyghur religious practices 
had been increasingly circumscribed since the 1990 Baren insurrection, even as religious 
policies for the Hui remained relaxed (Thum 2009). The authorities’ response to the 2009 
Shaoguan murders and demonstration-turned-riot in Ürümchi provided final evidence – in 
Uyghur eyes – of state protection of Xinjiang Han at the expense of local others. As Wang 
Lixiong later wrote, state campaigns against separatism and illegal religion that exclusively 
targeted Uyghurs had served to ‘pit the Han and local people in Xinjiang against one another’ 
(2014). When Hans are rendered the ‘reliable force’ in the region, while minorities are 
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increasingly surveilled, he argued, it causes Uyghurs to hate the Xinjiang Han (Wang and 
Yang 2007). This hatred was manifested during the 2009 Ürümchi riots, when Uyghur rioters 
hauled Han residents from their cars in the mixed Han-Uyghur area southeast of Yan’an Road 
and beat them (Millward 2009: 352).  
The local equation of Xinjiang Han with adverse state policies deepened after 2009. 
In 2012, following a knife attack by Uyghurs on Han civilians in Qarghiliq, a Uyghur teacher 
complained that there was ‘no difference between Xinjiang Han and the army’, with nearly 
all Han settlers supporting the state on ethnic issues: ‘They never ask the government to end 
religious pressure on the local [Uyghur] people, to stop arrests and executions, or call for 
equal job opportunities’ (Hoshur and Abdilim, 2012). Marginalized Uyghurs increasingly 
targeted Han civilians because of their close association with the state, especially since the 
state endorsed Han settlement in the Uyghurs’ southern heartland. Ethnic relations in 
Xinjiang have thus been increasingly shaped by the Chinese state’s discriminatory 
securitizing policies, a process also observed in Israel. There, relations between Palestinian 
Arabs and Jews have been influenced by the Israeli government’s understanding of national 
security as pertaining to the security of the Jewish people, not of all its citizens (Olesker 
2014: 379). Olesker notes that, to achieve successful securitization, the state needs a 
‘permissive audience’, as when majority Israeli opposition to Palestinian Arab participation 
in national decision-making processes allowed the Israeli state to introduce discriminatory 
laws against Arabs (2014: 378; 385). Following the 2009 Ürümchi riots, the Xinjiang Han 
community was not merely permissive; it actively demanded securitization (Moore 2009). 
Thus, a CCP Party leadership representing the majority Han population has acted 
aggressively to protect majority Han privilege in Xinjiang, in return for Han loyalty in times 
of regional instability. 
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Beyond ethnicised, discriminatory securitization practices in Xinjiang, it is local 
experiences of humiliation and violation that provoked the recent cycle of violence. As 
Meyer (2016a) notes, the problem with the state’s label of ‘religious extremism’ is that it 
securitizes all religious behaviours, not just violent ones. This has led to extreme forms of 
religious policing in rural Xinjiang, violating private Uyghur spaces and humiliating ‘earnest 
Muslim men and women’ (see Muhtar’s description above). Sweep-and-search operations in 
Uyghur homes, attempts by non-relatives to snatch women’s veils, invasion and closure of 
unauthorized mosques, and harassment of respected local clerics repeatedly provoked ugly 
scenes of state violence and retaliatory local violence between 2012 and 2015 because they 
embodied violation of pure Uyghur spaces by a Han state perceived as haram (unclean). 
 
Conclusions 
How far has Xinjiang been ‘Palestinized’, in the senses outlined by Wang Lixiong? First, the 
conflict became more ethnicized during and following the 2009 Ürümchi riots; with Han 
civilians in Xinjiang now viewed as synonymous with the Chinese state. Since then, children 
are increasingly drawn into the conflict, a conclusion apparently also drawn by the local 
government, which recently stated: ‘Parents shall influence their children with positive 
conduct, and educate their children to respect science, pursue civility, preserve ethnic unity, 
and resist and oppose extremification’ (Article 44, XUAR Regulations on De-extremification, 
2017). Second, increased Han settler activity in the south sparked conflict in 2012–2015, 
directly relating to control over local resources. Yet socio-economic competition and 
inequality are long-standing regional features, while local violence increased mainly after 
2012; I therefore concur with Hafez that while socio-economic factors invariably provide the 
structural conditions for Muslim rebellion, they alone are insufficient to engender militant 
action (2003: 9–19). Third, indiscriminate securitization of the Uyghur people since 2001 and 
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especially since 2009 triggered retaliatory incidents of local violence – some planned, others 
spontaneous. Simultaneously, it ensured that the Chinese government lost the goodwill of 
secular, integrated Uyghurs. As a retired state employee exclaimed with passion in 2016:  
 
Fine! Take the bad ones [Uy. äskilär] away, we agree with that! But we are not all bad. Every 
people has good and bad individuals. Why can’t they just treat the bad ones with suspicion and 
leave the rest of us alone?  
 
With reference to the ‘pressure cooker’ effect, zealous state securitization (particularly of 
Uyghur Islam) led to communal tensions repeatedly erupting as ‘a clap of thunder’ in 2012-
2015. Thus, Muslim peoples across national contexts may become violently militant when 
met with two circumstances: denial of meaningful access to state political institutions, and 
indiscriminate repressive state policies (Hafez 2003: 9–19). As dialogue channels evaporate 
and religious discrimination increases, society is destabilized as victims opt for violent rather 
than peaceful protest (Akbaba and Taydas 2011: 283–288). Yet not all of those ‘claps of 
thunder’ were pre-meditated and planned; many were spontaneous and retaliatory. 
Furthermore, there is little evidence that proponents were ideologically oriented to pursuit of 
global jihad. Available data suggests that even those Uyghurs taking refuge with militant 
organisations beyond China’s borders have declined to embrace such ideology.  
Among Wang’s six elaborations of ‘Palestinization’ in the Xinjiang context, state 
religious restrictions most often engendered local violence in 2012–2015. The criminalization 
of everyday religious practice, intrusive religious policing, and state penetration of pure halal 
spaces led to the most intense spate of retaliatory attacks on the state and state agents 
(including Han civilians, as a proxy for the state) seen in Xinjiang since 1949. As Akbaba and 
Taydas demonstrate, religious minorities experience discrimination by the majority as a threat 
to their moral framework, and respond by forming movements of religious defence (2011: 
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274–277). In contemporary Xinjiang, Uyghurs are witnessing intense state repression of their 
mother tongue and of Uyghur Islam, experienced as a direct threat to their ‘societal security’ 
and survival as a community (Wæver et al. 1993). In this way, in intensifying restrictions on 
Islam and language use, ‘Beijing neglected the existential threat its own policies posed 
towards the preservation of an acceptable level of Uighur self-identification’ (2007: 14). A 
similar dynamic is observable in Tibet, where China’s policies have generated ‘bitterness and 
insecurity’ in the Tibetan psyche, and protests in defence of Tibetan identity (Topgyal 2011: 
186, 195). It is also visible in Israel, where state securitization has made Palestinian Arabs 
feel less secure and more determined to cling to cultural values like language and religion 
(Olesker 2014: 387). 
 
Postscript 
House searches have been joined by still more intrusive forms of religious securitization 
since the arrival in October 2016 of new Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. These include 
mandatory checks on mobile phones for illegal religious content (Rajagopalan 2017), the 
‘Becoming Family’ policy involving visits to Uyghur homes by Han officials (‘relatives’) 
(Sulaiman and Niyaz 2017), and the ‘disappearance’ of hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs 
into ‘political re-education centres’ (Roberts 2018; Zenz 2018), referred to obliquely as 
mäktäp – ‘school’ – by frightened locals. These measures respond to the state’s goal of 
halting the ‘penetration’ of extremism, as outlined in the XUAR Regulations on De-
extremification (2017). That goal includes ‘making religion more Chinese’ (Article 4); 
prohibiting the rejection or refusal of public goods (Article 9); prohibiting ‘generalization of 
the concept of halal into areas beyond halal foods’ (Article 9); leading believers to ‘establish 
correct beliefs’ (Article 13); and guiding believers to ‘correctly handle the relationship 
between law and religion’ whilst confirming ‘correct faith’ (Article 35).  
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In 2018, the ‘Becoming Family’ programme was expanded to require between five 
and fourteen ‘home stays’ by Chinese officials in Uyghur households every 1–2 months, 
during which families must provide information about their personal lives and political 
views. Officials, tasked to warn families against ‘pan-Islamism,’ report back on ‘problems’ – 
e.g. extent of religious beliefs – and act to ‘rectify’ them. As one researcher observed: 
‘Muslim families across Xinjiang are now literally eating and sleeping under the watchful eye 
of the state in their own homes’ (Human Rights Watch 2018). State agencies post videos and 
images online of non-Muslim Han officials sharing intimate aspects of Uyghur domestic life, 
including sharing meals, sleeping in the same bed, and feeding the family’s children (Human 
Rights Watch 2018). In the context of Uyghurs’ adherence to a halal mode of living, which 
extends beyond dietary prescriptions, this constitutes a clear violation of pure, halal space. 
Other such violations include the punishment of a Khotanese official for refusing to smoke 
before male elders (Roberts 2018: 19) (thus ‘refusing public goods,’ ‘extending the concept 
of halal beyond halal foods’); making Uyghurs wrap Chinese New Year dumplings with Han 
‘older brothers and sisters’ (Byler 2018) (in a context where to ask if the dumplings contained 
pork would constitute ‘extremification’); and coercion of Khotänese villagers into conducting 
a Han foot-washing tradition (to express respect for elders) using bowls rather than clean, 
running water.19 While the 2017 ‘de-extremification’ document repeatedly calls on state 
organs and citizens to combat ‘penetration’ by extremists, intrusive state controls on 
moderate religious practice are experienced by Uyghur locals equally as ‘penetration’, 
indeed, as violation by a violent and coercive state. 
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